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THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF
MOBILE HOMES AS A PREFERRED USE
In Bristow v. City of Woodhaven,, plaintiff's property was zoned
single-family residential under the local municipal zoning ordinance.2
Plantiff sought a zoning amendment to the ordinance in order to
construct a mobile home park on his property. Upon the city's re-
fusal to amend the ordinance, plaintiff landowner brought suit,
questioning the reasonableness of the ordinance and its particular
provision of limiting mobile home parks to 75 sites.3 The trial court
found the ordinance, including the site limitation, unreasonable,
enjoined its enforcement, and ordered the city to issue the necessary
building permits.
On appeal, the city argued that plaintiff had failed to sustain his
burden of proof against the presumption of validity traditionally
granted such ordinances. The appellate court held, however, that
where a local ordinance is at odds with the general welfare, that
ordinance cannot be afforded presumed validity. The court, in reach-
ing this conclusion, stated that certain land uses bear such a real,
substantial, and beneficial relationship to the public health, safety,
and welfare as to be afforded a "preferred status." When a use is
given a preferred status, and that use is appropriate for a given site,
the burden of proof shifts to the city to justify the exclusion of that
use. Noting that legislative enactments geared toward the better-
ment of the general welfare give rise to a preferred use, the court
relied on State statutes recognizing mobile homes as a legitimate
use, 4 judicial precedent, and a nation-wide housing shortage in order
to afford mobile homes a preferred use status. Accepting the trial
court's finding that the ordinance had the effect of totally excluding
1. 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971).
2. Id. at 209 n.1, 192 N.W.2d at 323 n.1. One-family residential districts
were limited to: (a) one-family detached dwellings; (b) farms; (c) parks and
libraries; (d) municipal uses; (e) schools; (f) accessory buildings. Id.
3. Id. at 209, 192 N.W.2d at 324. The city offered no defense of the 75-site
limit.
4. MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 5.278 (31)-(127) (1961) describes in detail the
regulation, recognition and licensing of mobile home parks.
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mobile homes from the city,5 the court stated that the citizen's right
to decently-placed, suitable housing within their means could not be
denied by the municipality. Equating this right with the general wel-
fare, the court concluded that the city had not justified the exclusion
of the mobile home park.6
The presumption of validity that defendant city relied on in
Bristow was established by the Supreme Court in Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co.7 There the Court upheld the municipality's
right to exclude certain uses,s and conferred upon the municipal
ordinances a presumption of validity, unless the general public in-
terest outweighs the interest of the municipality. Under such circum-
stances, the general public interest would prevail.
The Euclid standard of presumed validity has played a significant
role in sustaining the validity of local zoning ordinances regulating
mobile homes. Municipal authorities generally do not welcome mobile
home parks because they allegedly crowd public facilities, present
sanitation problems, tend to stunt the growth potential of the land,9
hurt land values, and generally involve potential hazards to the
public health.10 As a result cities have excluded mobile homes from
single-family residential areas by the use of minimum lot sizes1' and
direct exclusion. 2 Although mobile homes are not, as a matter of
5. 35 Mich. App. at 220 n.9, 192 N.W.2d at 329 n.9. The trial court found
that:
The practical effect of this zoning approach is to exclude all trailer parks
from the city because the amount of land zoned B-3 is small in area and
already substantially developed for commercial uses which serves to increase
the vacant land price to a point where mobile home parks are not an eco-
nomic alternative to other commercial uses. Of course the location of a
mobile home park in a commercially zoned district also makes the park itself
less attractive as a residence and discourages potential developers to that
extent.
Id.
6. Id. at 221-22, 192 N.W.2d at 330. The court stated that the city must
show that the restriction has such a relation to the health, safety, morals and
general welfare as to outweigh the general interests of the region. Id.
7. 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
8. Id. See also Fisher, The General Public Interest v. the Presumption of
Validity: A Debatable Question, 50 J. URBAN L. 129, 131 (1972).
9. C. CRAWFORD, MICHIGAN ZONING AND PLANNING § 8.48, at 8-123 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as CRAWFORD].
10. State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Murray, 471 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Mo. 1971).
11. Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling Community Growth on
the Urban Fringe, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 370, 381.
12. Carter, Problems in the Regulation and Taxation of Mobile Homes, 48
IA. L. REv. 16, 24 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Carter].
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law, a nuisance per se,13 or considered detrimental to the public
health, safety, morals and general welfare,'14 the zoning ordinances
regulating the parks have been accorded a presumption of valid-
ity;15 and if the ordinance, as in Bristow, is enacted pursuant to a
comprehensive plan, the presumption of validity becomes even
stronger.16
The trend in favor of the validity of these ordinances is not free
from exceptions. Ordinances have failed to pass the test of constitu-
tionality where the municipality's total exclusion of mobile home
parks conflicts with a state statute recognizing mobile homes as a
legitimate use. Failure by the municipality to recognize this conflict
between state recognition and local exclusion by showing a legitimate
local interest which was protected by the exclusion has rendered
some local ordinances unconstitutional. 17 Such findings against local
exclusionary policies are not rare, but have not reversed the presumed
validity of local zoning ordinances.
Although ordinances completely excluding mobile homes have
generally been held invalid, ordinances excluding mobile homes from
residential areas, while providing for mobile home parks in non-
residential areas, have been almost universally upheld.18 Such ordi-
nances have been successfully attacked in the rare instances where it
has been proven that the residential designation excluding mobile
homes is inconsistent with the character of the neighborhood and,
therefore, unreasonable.- Thus, prior to Bristow, courts had afforded
13. Smith v. Building Inspector, 346 Mich. 57, 77 N.W.2d 332 (1956);
Richards v. City of Pontiac, 305 Mich. 666, 9 N.W.2d 885 (1943); CRAwVoRD
at 8-124.
14. CRAWFoRD at 8-123.
15. Rodd v. Palmyra Township, 42 Mich. App. 434, 438, 202 N.W.2d 446,
448 (1972); Carter at 39.
16. Carter at 37. Even if there is no comprehensive plan courts may presume
that the ordinance restriction was based on a comprehensive plan absent a showing
to the contrary. Davis v. City of Mobile, 245 Ala. 80, 82, 16 So. 2d 1, 3 (1943);
Cooper v. Sinclair, 66 So. 2d 702, 705 (Fla. 1953).
17. Gust v. Township of Canton, 342 Mich. 436, 438, 70 N.W.2d 772, 773(1955) ; Carter at 25.
18. Carter at 40; see, e.g., June v. City of Lincoln, 361 Mich. 95, 104 N.W.2d
792 (1960), where the court upheld a city ordinance allowing mobile homes only
on land zoned commercial.
19. Lakeland Bluff, Inc. v. County of Will, 114 Ill. App. 2d 267, 279, 252
N.E.2d 765, 770 (1969), where the land in question was zoned for farming,
but was the site of an abandoned strip mine and therefore unsuitable for farm-
ing. See also Knibbe v. City of Warren, 363 Mich. 283, 109 N.W.2d 766 (1961);
Dequindre Dev. Co. v. Charter Township of Warren, 359 Mich. 634, 103 N.W.2d
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zoning ordinances the traditional presumption of validity, and have
struck these ordinances down only when they conflicted with a state
statute or created an unreasonable classification in relation to the
neighborhood.
Before Bristow, mobile homes had not been given a preferred
status, but Michigan courts had given hospitals,20 churches,2 ' and
natural resources 22 a preferred status. The courts held that the exclu-
sion of these uses could not be held constitutional in light of the
more predominant general policy in favor of these uses.23 The fact
remains, however, that prior to Bristow the invalidation of zoning
ordinances on the basis of preferred uses and the general welfare had
been rare. This may be explained by the fact that since Euclid, courts
have had difficulty understanding exactly what situations require
the subservience of municipal interests to the larger and more im-
portant public interests. -4 As a result, the constitutionality of the
ordinances has been tested in light of internal interests such as prop-
erty values and local tastes, rather than external conditions. The
consequence has been enhancement of local interests at the expense
of the poor and disadvantaged who need the housing that is deemed
undesirable by the municipality. 25
The reluctance of courts to examine the general welfare was shown
in a recent Texas decision where the facts and circumstances were
quite similar to Bristow. In City of El Paso v. McArthur,26 plaintiff
landowner argued that his proposed mobile home park would help
alleviate the housing shortage. The McArthur court, unlike Bristow,
refused to consider the general welfare and held that the mobile
home park would hinder residential development. In refusing to
600 (1960); Edwards v. Township of Montrose, 18 Mich. App. 569, 171 N.W.2d
555 (1969).
20. Sisters of Bon Secours Hosp. v. City of Grosse Pointe, 8 Mich. App. 342,
154 N.W.2d 644 (1967).
21. Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Village of Orchard Lake, 333 Mich. 389,
53 N.W.2d 308 (1952).
22. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Paris Township, 351 Mich. 434, 88 N.W.2d
705 (1958).
23. See, e.g., Sisters of Bon Secours Hosp. v. City of Grosse Pointe, 8 Mich.
App. 342, 349, 154 N.W.2d 64-4, 651 (1967).
24. Feiler, Metropolitanization and Land-Use Parochialism-Toward a Judicial
Attitude, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 655 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Feller].
25. Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HAtv. L. Rav. 1645,
1647 (1971).
26. 473 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
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consider regional needs, the McArthur court may have excluded
those most in need of inexpensive housing, for the sake of local in-
terests. Decisions such as McArthur have the effect of excluding low-
cost housing, thus excluding low-income families from possible job
opportunities within reasonable commuting distances.27 In the past,
communities have used zoning powers to accomplish private ends
such as neighborhood protection, enhancement of property values,
and the preservation of social amenities. These community interests
have been reflected in zoning decisions such as McArthur because of
the refusal of courts to examine the general welfare and, as a result,
the decisions often conflict with the general welfare. 28
Another aspect of the inability of courts to understand when the
general welfare should be considered lies in the difficulty courts have
had in actually knowing what "health, safety, morals, and general
welfare" means. The phrase offers little guidance to judges,20 and
the end result has been to equate the public welfare with municipal
needs.3 0 What is needed is a judgment at the outset by the court
that a regional need does or does not exist, and if so, an extension of
the public welfare to include regional as well as local needs31
A practical result of a determination that there is a regional in-
terest involved is to shift the burden of proof from the landowner
to the city. It has been held that plaintiff need only show that the
municipal ordinance acts as a total exclusion of a use to shift the
burden onto the city.32 Although Bristow required more than a mere
27. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and
the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. Rlv. 767, 781 (1969). See Comment, Mobile Homes
in Kansas: A Need for Proper Zoning, 20 KAN. L. Rav. 87 (1972), which
suggests that as the cost of conventional housing moves upward, more and more
people find themselves priced out of the new home market-thus they turn to
mobile homes. Id. See also Note, The New Jersey Judiciary's Response to Ex-
clusionary Zoning, 25 RUTGERS L. Rlv. 172 (1971), which defines exclu-
sionary zoning as "the use of cost-inflating regulations to deny access to certain
areas to lower and moderate income groups," and concludes that this is a tool
for racial segregation. Id. at 173.
28. Feler at 661.
29. Id. at 657.
30. Note, Zoning: Looking Beyond Municipal Borders, 1965 WAsH. U.L.Q.
107, 118.
31. Id.
32. Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 1 Pa. Commw. 458, 275 A.2d
702, remanded, 445 Pa. 571, 577, 285 A.2d 501, 505 (1971) (city allowed to
produce evidence to justify the total exclusion of gas stations).
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showing of complete exclusion, *- the decision reflects the judicial
trend of suspicion regarding exclusionary ordinances where they
operate to inhibit the interests of the general public, thus resulting in
the presumption of validity carrying little or no weight.34
This trend of distrusting exclusionary ordinances in the regulation
of mobile home parks as evidenced by Bristow has been continued by
courts in Michigan. In Green v. Lima Township,35 the court re-
lied on Bristow, stating that a proposed mobile home park should
be given a preferred use status-that the interests of potential entrants
into the area and their right to suitable housing within their means,
in an aesthetically desirable area where there is a willing buyer, is
so basic that it is encompassed in the general welfare.38 The favored
use classification was also used in Simmons v. City of Royal Oak,37
Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights,38 and in Baker v. City of Algonac39
where the court equated the general welfare with the right and need
for decent housing.
Bristow was distinguished in Cohen v. Canton Township,40 where
the court found that, unlike Bristow, the ordinance did not exclude
mobile homes from the township and the area in which the proposed
mobile home park was to be built was not served by either municipal
sewage or water facilities. 41 Consequently, the Cohen court limited
Bristow to only those ordinances that completely exclude mobile
homes from the community.
The result of the Bristow analysis appears to be a more stringent
standard in examining municipal zoning ordinances than the one
established in Euclid, and a balancing of regional and local inter-
33. 35 Mich. App. at 217, 192 N.W.2d at 328. The court looked to the exclu-
sionary nature of the ordinance, state statutes, housing needs, and one's right to
decent housing. Id.
34. Fisher, supra note 8, at 131.
35. 40 Mich. App. 655, 199 N.W.2d 243 (1972).
36. Id. at 661, 199 N.W.2d at 247.
37. 38 Mich. App. 496, 196 N.W.2d 811 (1972).
38. 41 Mich. App. 21, 199 N.W.2d 567 (1972).
39. 39 Mich. App. 526, 198 N.W.2d 13 (1972). See also Congregation of
Dovid ben Nuchim v. City of Oak Park, 40 Mich. App. 698, 199 N.W.2d 557(1972).
40. 38 Mich. App. 680, 197 N.W.2d 101 (1972).
41. Id. at 684-85, 197 N.W.2d at 103. See also Midland Township v. Rapanos,41 Mich. App. 75, 199 N.W.2d 548 (1972), where the court refusedto apply the
Bristow favored use standard to billboards.
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ests. 2 Hopefully, such analysis will put an end to municipal zoning
in accordance with the tastes and values of the affluent members of
the community, and include a judicial examination of the policies
behind local zoning ordinances,4" so that the policies of the municipal
ordinances will not conflict with the regional interests. 44
As for mobile homes, Bristow has given them a new status in land
use control. What was once generally considered inferior housing"
has now been given a favored status. The question now is whether
mobile homes are to be considered comparable to apartments or
single-family dwellings. 4" If such a comparison can be made, efforts
on the part of municipalities to exclude mobile home parks from
single-family residential areas while allowing them in other areas of
the city may meet the same fate as the attempt to totally exclude
mobile homes and apartments from the community.4' The ordinances
will no longer reflect the preferences of the affluent, but the needs of
the region or the state.
This is not to say that exclusion of mobile homes should be in-
validated across the board, for there are instances where an ordi-
nance has the effect of excluding potential entrants and still may be
in furtherance of the general welfare. A prime example is where the
exclusion is a side effect of enforcing state health standards.48 But
even here the analysis centers on the regional needs balanced against
the local interests and the policies behind the ordinance.
If preferred status can be given to mobile homes, once thought to
42. Feiler at 673, suggests a balancing test as an improvement over the Euclid
standard.
43. D. MANDELxER, THE ZONING DILEMMA 8-9 (1971) states that courts have
been unwilling to examine municipal zoning policies. But see Washburn, Apart-
ments in the Suburbs: In re Appeal of Girsh, 74 Dicx. L. REv. 634, 658 (1970),
stating that courts are showing a willingness to examine municipal zoning policy.
44. Feller at 661.
45. Carter at 17.
46. See Bonnie View Country Club, Inc. v. Glass, 242 Md. 46, 217 A.2d 647
(1966), holding that apartments are comparable to single-family dwellings. See
also Rundell v. May, 258 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 1972), holding mobile homes to
be same as single-family dwellings; Lakewood Estates, Inc. v. Deerfield Township
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 37 Mich. App. 184, 186, 194 N.W.2d 511, 512 (1971),
holding mobile homes to be no different than apartments; In re Village 2 at New
Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968).
47. See In re Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), where the
court prohibited the city from excluding apartments.
48. Green v. Lima Township, 40 Mich. App. 655, 661-62, 199 N.W.2d 243,
247 (1972).
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be an undesirable type of housing,49 it can certainly be extended to
other residential uses, such as apartments,50 and possibly even non-
residential uses. This would definitely weaken the theory of Euclid,
which seemed to give almost unlimited power to the cities to zone as
they desire without regard to external interests.51
Extending the Bristow preferred status standard to various uses
would put almost every municipal zoning ordinance under strict
judicial scrutiny. Whatever the end result of the general welfare
considerations in zoning mobile home parks and other land uses, the
Bristow standard may lead to an end of zoning according to internal
tastes and values, without sacrificing the necessary health and safety
standards that further the general welfare. Perhaps then there will
be a reconciliation between the demand for low-cost housing and the
desire on the part of the affluent for restrictive zoning.52
Steven Sunde
49. CaXWFoRD at 8-123.
50. See Rundell v. May, 258 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 1972) holding mobile homes
to be comparable to residential uses; Lakewood Estates, Inc. v. Deerfield Town-
ship Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 37 Mich. App. 184, 186, 194 N.W.2d 511, 512
(1971).
51. Fisher, supra note 8, at 131.
52. See Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 384-85, 285 N.E.2d 291, 306,
334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 157-58, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) (dissenting
opinion), where the dissent speaks of this conflict between those demanding hous-
ing and those trying to restrict entrance into the area, and suggests that state
legislation is the proper solution to the problem.
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